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 During the process of starting and growing a company, entrepreneurs seek help from 
their key advisors, which include its directors, advisory board members, financiers, as well as 
others informally affiliated with the venture.  This paper examines how the various groups add 
value to a venture and assesses the relative value of their contributions.  Through a survey of 
high technology entrepreneurs, we find that directors, advisory board members and informal 
advisors add significant value by offering their expertise in various fields.  Surprisingly, 
investors add relatively little value, even in such key areas as strategic planning and finance.  
While professional venture capitalists add more value than private investors, even the venture 
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capitalists’ contribution was perceived lower than those of the other advisors in key areas.  Our 
results suggest that the contributions of investors may have been overestimated in conventional 
literature.  
 
Introduction 
 During the process of starting and growing a company, entrepreneurs seek not only 
physical or financial resources, but also expertise, guidance and contacts.  Much of the help 
comes from the company’s key advisors formally affiliated with the venture.  These usually 
consist of the company’s board of directors (BOD), the advisory board (AB) and financiers 
(INV).  Other advisors often include individuals and parties informally affiliated (OTHER), 
e.g., personal mentors, business partners or suppliers, who often offer valuable advice to new 
businesses.  The value-added resources provided by both formal and informal advisors have 
long been shown to substantially impact the performance of a venture (Castaldi & Wortman, 
1984; Zahra & Pearce, 1985).   
 In this paper, we examine how and to what extent the various groups add value to a 
venture and compare their relative contributions.  In particular, we analyze the contributions of 
investors  a group often discussed in academic and trade journals, yet still widely 
misapprehended in practice.  The key questions addressed in this research include: 
 
 How and to what extent does each advisory group add value to an entrepreneurial 
company? What are the major contributions of each group?  
 How do their contributions compare?  Who adds more value than others?   
 How valuable are the contributions of venture capitalists (VCs) and private 
investors?  Do investors really add as much value to new ventures as they often  
claim?  Is it important for ventures to have value-added investors, i.e., should 
entrepreneurs actively seek out certain investors  even if that means lower 
valuation or inferior term sheet?   
 
 The questions addressed here are particularly relevant for entrepreneurs in the earlier 
stages of their operation when they are in the process of formalizing relationships with their 
advisors and investors.  Entrepreneurs find it useful to know what and how much to expect 
from an advisory board member, director or investor; whom other entrepreneurs rely on for 
mentorship; or whether or not investors are as good of a source of strategic advice as they claim 
to be.  Preventing a mismatch in expectations can mitigate future potential conflict. 
 In particular, there has been much discussion on the topic of value-added investors 
(Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza and Timmons, 1989).  Many 
investors including VCs claim to add value beyond their financing, through their reputation, 
contacts and expertise.  Some VC firms market themselves as adding more value than others by 
being more “hands-on”.  Post-investment stage research has examined the interactions between 
entrepreneurs and VCs with inconclusive results (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Rosenstein et al., 
1990, 1989; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza and Timmons, 1989; Sapienza, 1992; 
MacMillan et al., 1988; Ehrlich et al., 1994).  Entrepreneurs could benefit a better 
understanding of the level of contribution investors make to their ventures. 
 Previous studies have examined the relationships between entrepreneurs and their 
advisors, but this research has usually addressed one group at a time.  Our research is unique in 
that it quantitatively compares the relative contributions made by all the major constituents 
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(BOD, AB and INV) as well as informal advisors (OTHER).  This approach allows for new 
managerial insights that previous studies were unable to offer.     
 
I. The Entrepreneurial Organization and its Advisors 
 Stevenson and Sahlman (1988) have argued that small companies should become more 
active in managing their advisors.  The following discussion highlights the major research on 
the roles and responsibilities of each advisory group: 
 The Board of Directors (BOD) of an organization commonly consists of key executives, 
investors and select outside individuals with relevant expertise.  It usually has a controlling, 
strategic and service-oriented function in commercial companies (Strebel, 2004; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989; Andrews, 1981).  Over the last few decades, several researchers have asserted the 
need for successful, privately held firms to have a working board of directors (Danco, 1975, 
1981; Heidrick, 1984; Jacobs, 1985).  Its role in smaller enterprises is similar – to assist the 
company in determining objectives and strategies, provide specialized expertise, and even act 
as arbitrators for feuding partners and family members (Danco, 1981; Mace, 1971).   
 Different boards, depending on their structure, size, composition and commitment, vary 
significantly in the level and type of contributions they make.  Active and able board members 
can add to the capacity of management by giving advice and counsel on problems within the 
business.  Furthermore, networks mediated by BODs can contribute to increased flexibility in 
strategic decision making (Borch & Huse, 1993).  Several studies have argued that they should 
play a more important role in the strategy development of small business firms (Castaldi & 
Wortman, 1984; Huse, 1990; Mace, 1948).    
 A growing number of high technology ventures rely on official advisory boards (ABs) 
with the intention of tapping into the members’ expertise, usually under a formal fee or equity 
arrangement. According to Inc. Magazine, ABs are popular in family-held companies, where a 
“guidance but not governance” role is well suited to dealing with family owners (Hadzima, 
1994).  ABs are also common in high technology (including biotechnology) ventures where 
special expertise is sought (e.g., clinical trial management).  Nevertheless, some practioners 
and academics have questioned the roles and benefits of ABs which often maintain loose 
arrangements with their ventures (Morkel and Posner 2002).  Often, they are viewed as mere 
promotional mechanisms to help a company appear credible.  Very few studies have attempted 
to measure the benefits of having an AB.  One exception is Morkel and Posner (2002) who 
found in a survey that a substantial percentage of advisory boards (41-60%) may be effective 
and value-adding.  
 Many investors including VCs, claim to add value beyond their financing, e.g., through 
avenues such as their reputation, contacts and expertise.  Some promise to add more value than 
others by being more “hands-on”.  Post-investment stage research has examined the 
interactions between entrepreneurs and VCs with inconclusive results (Hellmann and Puri, 
2002; Rosenstein et al., 1990, 1989; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza and Timmons, 
1989; Sapienza, 1992; MacMillan et al., 1988; Ehrlich et al., 1994).  For example, Gomes-
Mejia et al. (1990) assert that many CEOs viewed VC managerial intervention as 
counterproductive, while Hellmann and Puri (2002) and Sapienza (1992) find that VCs’ 
involvement can make positive contributions to the performance of ventures.   
 Although many studies have examined the contributions of VCs, most fail to compare 
them to those of other advisors, such as the ABs and BODs.  One notable exception is 
Rosenstein (1989), who found that CEOs of ventures did not perceive that VCs on their boards 
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added more value than other board members.  It is important for entrepreneurs to understand 
the level of support VCs provide, especially for the more promising entrepreneurs for whom 
investment is not critical for survival or who are offered multiple term sheets from VC firms 
each claiming to offer good advice.  Ehrlich et al. (994) find that VC firms require significant 
reporting and management time, while Hsu (2004) points out that VC financing, especially 
those from better known firms, can be very costly to entrepreneurs. 
 Another important source of advice for ventures include friends, mentors, service 
providers (such as consultants, attorneys and bankers), and business partners (including 
suppliers and customers) whom we group together under “OTHER” or as informal advisors.  
They make significant contributions for ventures usually without having formal financial 
arrangements for the services they provide.  Some of these people, inside the personal or 
extended networks of entrepreneurs, can significantly impact the performance of an 
organization (Dubini & Aldrich, 1991).  McGrath et al. (2003) found that software executives 
looking for advice tended to call upon people whom they knew well and that these advice 
networks were an important source of information about business, technical, and social issues.  
The entrepreneurial community appears filled with anecdotes of mentors, attorneys or suppliers 
who have made significant contributions to ventures – going well beyond the call of their duty.   
Despite the importance of these informal advisors, few studies have examined their 
contributions.  
 
II. Value-Adding Activities 
 We developed a short list of value-adding activities for our study.  We began with the 
20 investor involvement activities discussed in MacMillan et al. (1988) and Ehrlich et al. 
(1994).  For practical reasons, we shortened the list to 8 activities after a series of brainstorming 
sessions with an initial sample of entrepreneurs.  While this is not an exhaustive list, it covers 
some of the most important contributions that entrepreneurs expect from their advisors. 
 Credibility.  An early stage venture with little history can immediately gain a certain 
level of credibility by associating itself with established individuals or organizations (Hubbard, 
2000).  Such a boost in credibility can facilitate meetings with partners and customers that a 
new venture may otherwise be unable to arrange.  Thus, advisors or investors who can add to 
credibility can make a significant impact on an organization’s performance. 
 Technical Expertise.  Strong technical expertise can significantly impact the 
performance of a venture.  One of the primary roles of a BOD or an AB member is to provide 
relevant expertise to an organization (Strebel, 2004, Danco, 1981; Mace, 1971).  Most venture 
capitalists usually have an industry focus, enabling them to provide specific skills, such as 
customer understanding to their portfolio companies (Sapienza, 1992; Gorman & Sahlman, 
1989). 
 Financial Expertise.  Financial expertise is important for a wide range of activities such 
as financial control, cash management, raising capital and interfacing with investor groups.  
Many entrepreneurs have little practical experience with many aspects of financial 
management.  Even those with financial experience often prefer to receive guidance from their 
advisors.  In a study of entrepreneurial firms that received equity investments, Ehrlich et al. 
(1994) found that interfacing with investor groups, obtaining alternative equity financing and 
monitoring financial performance were among the top activities for which entrepreneurs sought 
help from their lead investors.   
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 Business & Marketing Strategies.  One of the board’s primary responsibilities is to 
assist in determining the objectives and strategies of its company (Strebel, 2004, Danco, 1981; 
Mace, 1971).  Studies show evidence that both strategic planning and outside assistance can 
have a positive impact on venture performance (Chrisman, 1989; Bracker & Pearson, 1986).  
Formulating business strategy and serving as a “sounding board” are among the top activities in 
which ventures wanted involvement from their investors (Ehrlich, 1994; MacMillan, 1981). 
 Sales Leads & Contacts.  Few contributions are of more direct benefit for an early stage 
enterprise than assistance with sales or promising sales leads.  A well-connected group of 
advisors can often be the source of early sales leads.  MacMillan (1983) asserts that building 
relevant contacts and networks is a key factor in any firm’s success – which directors and other 
advisors often bring. 
 Entrepreneur Mentoring.  An entrepreneur’s personal capacity as a manager and a 
leader undoubtedly has an impact on the performance of his or her organization.  Mentoring 
may come in a wide range of areas including leadership, personnel management, operational 
management or technical knowledge.  Saxenian (2002) discovers that mentoring plays an 
important role in the success of Asian American entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley. 
 Recruiting & Staffing.  The success of an enterprise depends heavily on having the 
right management and technical talent.  Entrepreneurs often rely on their advisors to identify 
managers with needed capabilities.  Sanford et al. (1994) confirmed that entrepreneurs 
frequently sought expertise in the area of staffing from their investors. 
 Managerial Systems & Control.  First-time entrepreneurs need substantial guidance in 
developing organization charts and reporting structures and in implementing compensation 
incentives, hiring protocols and operational processes.  Some studies have suggested that 
entrepreneurs viewed operational and administrative issues as their most important concerns in 
starting a new business (Davis, Jones & Kraft, 1981; Voziki & Glueck, 1980). 
 
III.  Method 
 The main part of our survey asks the respondents to rate the level of contributions of 
each of the 4 groups – AB, BOD, INV and OTHER.  A seven-point Likert scale ranging from 
“Insignificant” to “Very significant (positively changing the fortune of the company)” was used 
for each of the 8 contribution categories. 
 To create a pool of potential respondents, we tapped into the MBA alumni pool from 
UCLA and USC, the University of Chicago and the University of Pennsylvania.  Almost all 
communication was conducted via email.  Out of 112 participants, 51 (45%) surveys were 
complete and relevant.   
 Surveys were discarded when a company did not have a working BOD or an outside 
INV.  We also rejected surveys whose BODs did not have at least one outside board member 
who was not a lead investor.  In 55% of our sample, the BOD had at least 1 non-investor 
outside member, many of whom were former executives and industry experts.  On the average, 
our sample had fewer non-investor outside board members (average 0.7) than Rosenstein et al. 
(1993) whose sample had 1.3 non-investor outside board members.  We attribute this difference 
to the fact that our sample had more early stage companies.  A board member who was a 
professional investor (angel or VC) was categorized as an investor, not as a director, in our 
analysis.   Overall, 25 of our companies had professional VCs as lead investors; 23 had private 
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individuals or angel investors as lead investors; and for the remaining 3 companies strategic 
investors were the lead investors. 
 In our final sample, 32 respondents stated that they had at least one OTHER advisor 
who added value to their businesses.  Participants were asked to identify who, other than an 
INV or member of an AB or the BOD, provided the most help to identify their OTHER 
advisors.  They included former angel investors, business partners (including Intel and 
Microsoft), retired executives, and personal acquaintances.   
 Some additional profile information of our final sample is as follows:  
 
 The entrepreneurs were between the ages 33 and 48, with the median age of 41 
 They all had MBAs from top 25 business schools 
 The majority (72%) lived in Southern California. 
 They were all in technology, most (75%) were in IT (software, computer and 
electronics) with the remaining (25%) in biotechnology  
 Their companies were in business between 1 and (minimum requirement) 5 years, 
with an average of 2.4 years.   
 Their companies ranged from 0 to $50M in revenue and from 4 to 245 employees. 
 
IV. Results 
 Table I lists the mean values obtained from the survey for the level of contributions 
made by each of the advisor groups.  Overall results indicate that AB, BOD and OTHER made 
similar average contributions (3.8, 3.8, 3.7), while the average contribution from INV was 
smaller (3.1).  It is noteworthy that AB and BOD made significant contributions in Technology 
Expertise, Financial Expertise and Strategy while INV lagged behind consistently.  OTHER 
seemed particularly effective in Mentoring. 
 One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was utilized to examine if the differences in 
the means were similar or significantly different.  F-tests show that the mean contribution 
levels were not significantly different between the groups in Sales Leads & Contacts and in 
Recruiting & Staffing.  This makes sense considering that neither activity is considered the 
primary responsibility of any group.   
 On the other hand, the ANOVA results indicated that a more thorough examination was 
necessary for the other activities.  Various combinations of paired t-tests were run to confirm 
the following observation summarized in Table II. 
 It is clear from the results that ABs added more than just Credibility or name value. 
They were also highly valued for their contributions to Technical Expertise and Strategy.  The 
BOD also played an important role.  It was instrumental in adding to Strategy and Financial 
Expertise, and it added more value in Systems & Control than any other group.  Interestingly, 
INVs added the least amount of value to ventures (other than through their financial 
investments).  One might have assumed that they would be more involved and motivated to add 
value.  Another surprising finding was the level of contributions made by OTHER.  Although 
in many cases they received no formal compensation, these unofficial advisors added 
significant value through Mentoring and other activities.  Their level of contribution was not 
significantly different from AB and BOD in Credibility, Strategy, and Financial Expertise. 
 Having observed that INVs contributed relatively little to ventures, we examined if 
there were any differences in the contribution levels between private investors and professional 
VCs.  We divided our sample of 51 respondents into 25 companies whose lead investor was a 
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VC and 23 whose lead investor was a private individual (3 were strategic investors).  Results 
are illustrated in Table III. 
 We found that VCs added significantly more value with respect to Financial Expertise, 
in such activities as planning, managing cash and follow-on financing.  This makes sense since 
VCs have stronger financial backgrounds than private investors.    
  
V. Discussion 
 The results of our study are generally consistent with those of prior studies.  This 
research corroborates the value of having a working BOD as asserted in Strebel (2004), Danco 
(1981, 1975), Heidrick (1984) and Jacobs (1985).  Furthermore, it suggests that a BOD 
excluding the investors can add significant value to a venture.  This makes sense considering 
that many of the non-investor BOD members are deliberately recruited for their strong 
expertise in one or more areas.  Many of them also have operating experiences, which many 
investors do not.   
 We note that ABs can add significant value to a venture, particularly by providing 
Credibility, Strategy and Technical Expertise.  Many early stage ventures are able to recruit 
high-profile individuals to be in the advisory board, in part because these roles require minimal 
commitment.  Nevertheless, once on board, AB members appear to add significant value. 
 Our findings show that the category OTHER can add significant value to a company, 
particularly through personal mentoring.  We learned that some entrepreneurs were unwilling 
to confide with their BODs or INVs for certain issues and turned to their personal advisors for 
help.  In most situations, entrepreneurs sought advice from people they trusted and had personal 
relationships with, consistent with findings by McGrath et al. (2003).  Detailed interviews 
revealed that some of the OTHER advisors were individuals sufficiently qualified to be BOD or 
AB members but were not interested in an official arrangement.  Overall, the data show that 
significant contributions were made by individuals without any formal ties (e.g., pay or equity) 
to the organization. 
 On the other hand, INVs add much less value than might be expected.  While 
counterintuitive at first, anecdotes and explanations provided by the surveyed entrepreneurs 
helped validate our observation.  “Investors are chosen for their ability to write a check, not for 
their ability to help”, one interviewee clarified.  “In comparison to their marketing pitch, their 
contribution was disappointing,” said another.  Most survey participants, when they were 
shared the results – particularly the low scores of investors –  expressed that they were not 
surprised.  One entrepreneur of a biotech company even described how a VC group nearly 
destroyed his company with poor hiring moves. 
 Comparing the value-added of VCs to BODs, we find that VCs have a lower mean in 
most situations.  However, these differences are not statistically significant except for Strategy.  
This finding is similar to Rosenstein (1993), where contributions of VCs on boards were found 
to be not significantly different from those of other board members.   
 As one might have expected, VCs provided more Financial Expertise than private 
investors.  This result is consistent with Ehrlich et al. (1994), where the major difference 
between VCs and private investors was that VCs were more involved with obtaining alternative 
equity and debt financing, monitoring financial performance and serving as a sounding board.  
Apart from Financial Expertise, our results show no other statistically significant difference 
between VCs and private investors. 
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 Our results do not imply that investors do not add any value in the absolute sense.  They 
clearly do, as confirmed by our results and other studies such as Gorman & Sahlman (1989) 
and Sapienza (1992).   Certainly, a group of intelligent individuals can provide useful advice.  
However, the celebrated stories of legendary investors who can elevate a startup dramatically in 
a very short time are far less common than reported in popular press or often expected by 
entrepreneurs. 
 Furthermore, our results raise new questions about the true importance of landing value-
adding investors, something widely stressed in real life and in academic literature.  While 
receiving investment from experienced and influential venture capitalists would be very 
helpful, there appears to be little need for ventures to limit themselves to such investors only.   
Our findings suggest that there may be other parties as well or better equipped to help ventures 
than the VCs.  If entrepreneurs are able to obtain the expertise they need from a wide range of 
people (and our data suggest that entrepreneurs should do so actively), they might as well align 
themselves with investors who offer the best terms.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 It is important to note that the study has some limitations.  First, it was conducted 
mostly from a homogeneous group within a single region working in similar industries.  Thus, 
these findings may not apply to others, e.g., those who don’t have the comparable educational 
or business background of our sample or who work in other industries.  For example, 
entrepreneurs with little management experience might have found more value in the advice of 
their financiers.  Similarly, entrepreneurs with weaker personal connections than our sample 
might have found their investors to be more important. 
 Only a few of the VCs in our sample would be classified as “first-class” VCs as 
described by MacMillan et al. (1989).  The recent years have seen a significant rise in the 
number of VCs, many with limited credentials and capabilities.  Our results might have been 
different if all our investors had been first-class VCs.  Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that 
not all entrepreneurs funded by first-class VCs are satisfied with the support they receive.  One 
interviewee, who had received investment from one of the premier VC firms in Silicon Valley, 
complained about the lack of help he had received.   He also added that only those companies 
overseen directly by the two legendary senior partners of the VC firm received adequate 
assistance.  He felt that the other partners and associates of this prestigious VC firm neither had 
the experience nor the contacts to significantly help his and other ventures. 
 The research could be extended in many ways.  One research idea may be to extend this 
paper and the work of Stevenson and Sahlman (1988) to examine effective means of managing 
one’s advisors.  Another idea may be to develop a better understanding of the informal advisors 
who are often so helpful to the success of a new venture.  It would be interesting to explore 
who they are and what motivates them to help. 
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Table I 
 
Contribution Advisory 
Board 
Board of 
Directors
1
 
OTHER INV df F 
Credibility 4.7 4.5 4.4 3.9 3,161 3.3* 
Technical 4.2 3.6 3.0 3.0 3,160 7.2** 
Financial 4.2 4.2 3.7 3.2 3,159 4.8* 
Strategy 4.5 4.5 4.1 3.1 3,161 14.1** 
Sales Leads 3.8 3.4 3.9 3.4 3,160 1.76 
Mentoring 3.7 3.8 4.3 2.7 3,159 9.2** 
Recruiting 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.3 3,161 1.5 
Systems 2.8 4.2 2.8 3.4 3,161 6.1** 
Average 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.1  
*p < 0.05    **p<0.01                       
1. Excludes the lead investor who is often on the Board 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II 
 
 
Contribution Key results of paired t-tests 
Significant Not significant 
Credibility AB, BOD, OTHER > INVs (with p<0.01) AB, BOD, OTHER  
Technical AB > INV, OTHER (with p<0.01) AB, BOD 
Financial AB, BOD > INVs (with p<0.05)  AB, BOD from OTHER 
Strategy AB, BOD > INVs (with p<0.05)  AB, BOD from OTHER 
Sales Leads  AB, BOD, INV, OTHER  
Mentoring OTHER > INV (with p<0.01) OTHER from AB, BOD 
Recruiting  AB, BOD, INV, OTHER  
Systems BOD > AB, INV and OTHER (with p<0.01) AB, INV, OTHER 
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Table III 
 
 
 
Contribution Private 
investors 
Venture 
Capitalist 
t-statistic 
Credibility 4.2 3.8 1.04 
Technical 2.6 3.1 1.62 
Financial 2.7 3.7 2.88** 
Strategy 3.2 3.4 1.35 
Sales Leads 3.6 3.4 0.46 
Mentoring 2.9 3.1 1.47 
Recruiting 2.6 2.2 0.83 
Systems 3.4 4.0 1.32 
Average 3.1 3.3 
*p < 0.05    **p<0.01 
 
 
 
